Higher Education: the Last Frontier of Track II Diplomacy

‘Stop Chinese Communist Prying by Vindicating Intellectual Safeguards in Academia Act of 2025’ threatens to become law in the 119th Congress. This bill prohibits nationals of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter China) from conducting research or study in the U.S. Though not yet law, this bill signals the threat to Sino-U.S. academic ties already materialising through Proclamation 10043. Washington justified its action as protection of American Intellectual Property (IP) from Chinese espionage, aiming towards national security. While real risks exist, treating academic exchange as national security collateral is turning universities from global research hubs into guarded silos — weakening both innovation and their diplomatic role.

Purpose of Higher Education

Historically, dual purposes supported the higher educational system. Trinh’s research focused on functionalist accumulation of human capital for national development, while Ashwin wrote about the individual advancement of one’s character and social standing. However, the current fragmented global order serves the third purpose: the university as a vital site for Track II diplomacy. Modern universities are recognised as neutral ground that fosters cross-border academic exchange. This new role of the university complements traditional diplomacy, even when formal state relations are challenged. Scholars pursuing research and inquiry, aligning with the second purpose of higher education, benefit from this role through expanded access to perspectives and information. Yet, states increasingly view academic collaboration through a narrow prism of national security. This leads to the subordination of higher education to the demands of strategic decoupling.

Academic Exchange and National Security Threat

Since the Chinese Initiative in 2018, in 2020, Washington has strategically reinforced the examination of Chinese scholars’ entrance for national security. According to Chad Wolf, the head of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington seeks to block the American IP flowing to China’s military fusion strategy. The concern is supported by China’s accelerating technological development. As Simon and Wagner claim, China has exceeded the U.S.’s scientific article publications, now producing around twice the American global output. In response, about a thousand visas of Chinese nationals were cancelled, due to Proclamation 10043. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) followed, as they have significantly restricted research cooperation with Chinese institutes. The Guardian reported that Purdue University enacted an unofficial decline policy for Chinese and other national students, in respect of the House Select Committee of the CCP’s letter. 

The actions’ results bring up controversial reviews, mainly due to the students who lost educational opportunities. Security advocates claim that security measures only target high-risk fields and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) related scholars. Yet, data-based analytics disagree. Due to the vague definition of the “18 critical technologies” in STEM, Foreign Policy estimated that over 100,000 students from Hong Kong and China could be affected. Universities warn of broad research disruption from even targeted screening.

Counterarguments and Rebuttals

Proponents of the Stop CCP VISAs Act argue that the CCP operates through military-civil fusion, claiming the indistinct nature of a private Chinese student and a state agent. The cited Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s claim says that students act as ‘non-traditional collectors’ of foreign IP, making far-reaching constraints the sole prevention of American innovation loss. However, such an unspecified, broad strategy is a blunt instrument for this acute issue. While China operates in military-civil fusion in some areas, the total ban barricades the U.S.’s edifying gain. Over 85% of Chinese STEM PhDs stay in the U.S. to work in the American workforce. The illustrated restriction unleashes the return of the talents to Beijing. Such a loss will contribute to China’s technological development, possibly in the military, based on U.S.-trained personnel.

Critics contend that academic exchange, one value of higher education, is currently single-routed. The justification is the restricted access of American scholars to Chinese data and archives, while China enjoys full access vice versa; such a structure creates a strategic vulnerability that China exploits without a return. However, mirroring China’s model to the U.S. risks the loss of the U.S.’s global free intellectual hub. Under the current volatile geopolitical logic, the U.S. should accept the inherent “flesh” of localised security risks to secure the “bone” of long-term strategic influence and talent retention. Maintaining these academic channels serves as a critical diplomatic safety valve. These entrenched scholarly networks provide the strategic redundancy, in case formal statecraft falters, to recalibrate and prevent a total relations rupture. By recognising such a power of higher education, the U.S. could navigate a fragmented global order.

Even under such a benefit, sceptics argue that the Track II model is outdated from the Cold War era. The logic is that universities are now a vulnerable entrance for foreign operations of the CCP. The concern lies in the prediction of the CCP weaponising the openness of universities. However, such concern neglects the core of diplomacy: empathy. True national security requires a sophisticated understanding of the adversary’s intent. By severing these ties, the U.S. loses an essential human database for precise prediction. In the data-driven era, the contextual knowledge about the rival’s strategies is a crucial asset to gain; the most effective access is through the continued, albeit monitored, flow of the global academic commons.

Conclusion

Today’s fortified American campus aims for great national security. However, the counter is a critical, innovative, and diplomatic casualty. Universities denying the foreign intellectuals will forfeit their value as a neutral base for Track II dialogue. In the contemporary disunited global narrative, policymakers must recognise that higher educational institutions truly flourish as an autonomous scholarly ground. Hence, the United States can ensure its higher education remains a final, resilient bridge in the era of isolation by securing global talent and contextual intelligence through continued academic openness.

This essay has been awarded the Honors from the 2026 Harvard International Review Academic Writing Contest. Please refer to the individual hyperlinks to view the works cited.

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